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A House Is Not A Home: City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center
I. Introduction
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,' the Su-
preme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance which prohibited
the establishment of a home for the mentally retarded in a
neighborhood zoned to allow nursing homes, dormitories, and
apartment hotels.2 The Court found that to exclude the retarded
from such a neighborhood reflected irrational prejudices and
thus, the ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. In so holding, the Court declined to des-
ignate mentally retarded persons as either a suspect or a quasi-
suspect class4 because their distinguishing characteristics were
considered to be relevant to permissible state interests.5 The
Court's conclusion was that although the ordinance was consti-
tutional on its face, it was unconstitutional as applied in this
case.
Part II of this Note reviews the history of the Court's appli-
cation of the equal protection doctrine. Part III examines the
Court's previous dealings with the retarded. Part IV summarizes
the decision of the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center. Part V analyzes the Court's decision
and concludes that the class of mentally retarded persons bears
a close resemblance to those classes which the Court has deemed
"suspect" and thus, is worthy of heightened scrutiny, if not
strict scrutiny. Part VI concludes that the Court, in the name of
judicial restraint, abdicated its proper role as it concerns men-
tally retarded persons.
1. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
2. Id. at 3260.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 3255.
5. Id. at 3258.
6. Id. at 3260.
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II. Background
A. The Equal Protection Doctrine
The guarantee of equal protection embodied in the four-
teenth amendment has evolved into "the single most important
concept in the Constitution for the protection of individual
rights."'7 The equal protection clause8 had "long been treated by
the Court as a dubious weapon in the armory of judicial review"
and had been characterized by Justice Holmes as the "last resort
of constitutional arguments."'10 As recently as the 1960's, "judi-
cial intervention under the banner of equal protection was virtu-
ally unknown outside racial discrimination cases."" The emer-
gence of the equal protection clause as a means of promoting
individual rights during the Warren Court's last decade brought
about a dramatic change.12
The origin of the doctrine of equality can be traced to The
Declaration of Independence.' 3 The language which embodied
the doctrine, however, was not incorporated into the Constitu-
tion until the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. 4 It is the
only clause of section one of the amendment that added new
language to the Constitution. 5 The clause was designed to im-
pose a positive duty upon the states to supply protection to all
persons in the enjoyment of their natural and inalienable rights,
and to do so equally.' 6
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
7. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 585 (2d ed. 1983).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."
9. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341,
341 (1949).
10. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
11. Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term - Foreward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine On A Changing Court: A Model For A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1972).
12. Id. Earl Warren was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1953 to 1968.
13. The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
14. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 9, at 341. The phrase "equal protection" was
found in virtually all forms of the proposed amendment in the Thirty-ninth Congress.
Embodied explicitly in the Freedman's Bureau, Civil Rights, and other bills, it was the
common meeting ground of those who carried the fourteenth amendment through the
Thirty-ninth Congress. Id. at 341-42.
15. Id. at 341.
16. Id.
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by its own terms, applies only to state and local governments. 17
The guarantee of equal protection, however, applies to the fed-
eral government as well. With regard to the federal government,
it is derived from the implied equal protection guarantee of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.'5 Judicial review
under the due process clause and the equal protection clause isidentical.19
An understanding of what the equal protection clause
means must begin with an acknowledgement of the extent of its
mandate. A formulation by Justice Matthews in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins20 is indicative of its sweep. As Justice Matthews stated,
"The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of
equal laws."'2 ' "[This] statement ... makes it abundantly clear
that the quality of legislation as well as the quality of adminis-
tration comes within the purview of the clause. ' '22
When reviewing the validity of legislation under the equal
protection clause, a distinction must be drawn between general
legislation which applies without qualification to all persons, and
special legislation which applies to a limited class of persons.
Equal protection cannot command that all laws apply univer-
sally to all persons, since almost any legislative action imposes
special burdens upon, or grants special benefits to, special
groups or classes of individuals.23 As Justice Brewer stated in
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law."
18. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (racial segregation in the District of
Columbia public schools was a denial of due process guaranteed by the fifth amend-
ment); Weinberger v. Wiesenfield, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (gender-based distinction
of Social Security Act held to discriminate against female wage earners under equal pro-
tection guarantee of due process clause of fifth amendment); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975) (gender-based distinction favoring female line officers in Navy
held not to violate due process clause).
19. NOwAK, supra note 7, at 585.
20. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
21. Id. at 369. Professors Tussman and tenBroek stated that this expression of the
doctrine's meaning "has been frequently cited with approval and has never been chal-
lenged by the Court." Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 9, at 342.
22. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 9, at 342.
23. Id. at 343. The classical statement of this unchallenged view is found in Barbier
v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885):
[N]either the [fourteenth] amendment - broad and comprehensive as it
is - nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with the power of the
State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the
1986]
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Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad v. Matthews," "It is the
essence of a classification that upon classes are cast.., burdens
different from those resting upon the general public. ... Indeed,
the very idea of classification is that of inequality. '2 5
In order to resolve the contradicting terms of equality and
classification in laws, the Court has developed the concept of
reasonable classification. Stated simply, reasonable classification
requires that those similarly situated should be similarly
treated - the measure of reasonableness of a classification is
the degree of its success in meeting this two-fold "similarity"
requirement.26
In determining the reasonableness of a classification it is es-
sential that the Court look beyond the classification to the pur-
pose of the law: "A reasonable classification is one which in-
cludes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law."'27 The essential determination of whether a
classification drawn is reasonable in light of its purpose provides
the Court with a scope of review.2" Thus, equal protection tests
whether the classification is properly drawn in light of the pur-
pose of the law.
health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so
as to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources, and add to its
wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special
character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain districts, such
as for draining marshes and irrigating arid plains. Special burdens are often neces-
sary for general benefits. . . . Regulations for these purposes may press with more
or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, not to impose
unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote.., the general
good.
Id. at 31-32.
24. 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
25. Id.
26. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 9, at 344. A clarification can perhaps be made
by describing what the test of "similarity" does not mean. It does not mean that the law
applies equally to all those to whom it applies; as Professors Tussman and tenBroek
point out, King Herod's mandate that all male children born on a particular day be
killed would pass muster under this definition. Id. at 351. Furthermore, similarity does
not require that the classes correspond to some natural grouping, or that they separate
those who naturally belong together. Id. at 346.
27. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 9, at 346 (emphasis added).
28. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 995 (1978).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/4
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B. The Judicial Task
Legislatures, as well as courts, are bound by the mandate of
equal protection.2 e To the legislator, "the equal protection clause
is a demand that, as he promulgates laws, the classifications he
creates be reasonably related to the purpose of the law." 30 Fa-
voritism or inequality must be guarded against, and special bur-
dens or benefits must be imposed only because of their contribu-
tion to the general good. 1
The judicial task begins with the identification of the pur-
pose of the law in question.32 Whether the classification within
the law satisfies the equal protection guarantee depends upon
two things: the purpose attributed to the legislative act, and the
determination of whether there is a sufficient relationship be-
tween the asserted governmental end and the classification. 33
When the court defers to the choice of goals made by the
legislature, or its determination of whether the classification re-
lates to those goals, the court "ha[s] in fact taken the position
that it is the function of the legislature rather than the judiciary
to make the equal protection determination as to the particular
law."'3 4 Conversely, when the court takes the position that the
judiciary is able to assess issues "in a manner superior to, or at
least different from" s the legislature, it is making an indepen-
dent judgment of whether the law has a purpose which conforms
to the Constitution. 36
The threshold question for the court presents two alterna-
tives: first, whether it will engage in a searching evaluation of
the legislative classifications, thereby assuming the position that
it may override the democratic process of legislative decision-
making; or second, whether it will defer to the legislature, limit-
ing the concept of a unique judicial function. 7
29. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 9, at 365.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 366.
33. NOWAK, supra note 7, at 590.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. These two divergent theories of judicial decisionmaking under the doctrine
of equal protection reflect what Professors Tussman and tenBroek see as the two views
1986]
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C. Selection of a Standard of Review
1. The Rational Basis Test
The Warren Court produced two standards of review which
correspond to the two courses of action - deference to or inde-
pendent evaluation of legislative determinations - open to the
court under the doctrine of equal protection. Each standard rep-
resents a distinct method of analysis, and the choice of one over
the other is based upon the nature of the particular question
posed to the court.-3
The first standard of review has been characterized as the
rational basis test.39 This standard is generally utilized when the
case before the court concerns social or economic legislation.40
of the institution of judicial review:
One's view of the judge's task will depend to a large extent upon whether one
thinks of judicial review in terms of a system of functional differentiation or in
terms of a system of checks and balances. . . . The 'functional' view rests upon
the assumption that the judicial task differs radically from the legislative task,
and that for the judiciary to address itself to the same questions that the legisla-
ture has answered is an invasion of the legislative function by the courts. The
theory of 'checks,' on the other hand, really requires that the court reconsider the
same questions that the legislature has already considered.
Both theories have their difficulties. The functional theory is hard pressed to
delineate distinct functions. The theory of checks has to win its way against the
undemocratic character of judicial lawmaking. The United States Supreme Court
attempts to meet these difficulties by maintaining that it is not its function, as it
reviews legislation, to substitute its views about what is desirable for that of the
legislature. It thus bows in the direction of the functional separation theory. But
at the same time the Court speaks of judicial self-restraint as the answer to the
undemocratic aspects of the check and balance system. Kept apart from each
other, the essential incompatibility of these two attitudes often escapes notice. For
self-restraint is no virtue if the Court has a unique function to perform. If, on the
other hand, the self-restraint is justified, the belief in a unique judicial function is
untenable. These difficulties plague the Court at every stage in the process of ap-
plying the equal protection clause.
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 9, at 365-66.
38. A complete history of the evolution of the standards of review is beyond the
scope of this Note. Since judicial intervention under the doctrine of equal protection was
virtually unknown at the beginning of the 1960's outside of racial discrimination cases,
the discussion of "standards of review" begins with what has become known as "the two-
tier attitude" of the Warren Court. Gunther, supra note 11, at 8.
39. This standard is also referred to as "minimal scrutiny" and the "rational rela-
tionship test." TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-2, at 994-995; NOWAK, supra note 7, at 591.
40. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 994-95. See also, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (upholding the state's mandatory retirement age of 50
for state police officers); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981) (upholding a Con-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/4
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By the Court's own admission, this inquiry "employs a relatively
relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the draw-
ing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task
.... "41 The Court does not demand perfection in making classi-
fications, acknowledging that this is "neither possible or
necessary.
'4
The rational basis standard, then, is the choice of deference,
one which presumes constitutionality. In short, when applying
the rational basis test, the judiciary does not sit as a superlegis-
lature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determination. 3
Thus, when the question involves general social or economic
legislation, the Court has determined that it has no unique func-
tion to perform; that the judiciary has no special capability to
assess legitimate governmental ends or the reasonableness of
classifications that is superior to that of the legislature.4 4 The
check employed by the judiciary is a requirement that a rational
basis be put forth by the legislative body or that a state of facts
can be conceived to justify the legislative classification.45
gressional act which excluded inmates of public institutions from a subsistance allowance
under the Supplemental Security Income program of the Social Security Act).
41. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314.
42. Id. (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)). Dandridge con-
cerned a Maryland welfare regulation which provided needy families with aid. Under the
regulation most families received an amount in accordance with a standard of need, but
a ceiling of about $250 per month was imposed by the state, regardless of the size of the
family and its actual need. The Supreme Court, granting the state great latitude in dis-
pensing its available funds, held that Maryland's regulation was an acceptable means of
allocating its limited financial resources. The state's purposes of sustaining as many fam-
ilies as possible and encouraging employment were rationally supportable and free from
invidious discrimination.
43. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). This case concerned a New
Orleans ordinance which prohibited pushcart food sales in the French Quarter, a major
tourist attraction of the city. By a "grandfather clause," however, pushcart vendors who
had operated in the Quarter for at least eight years were exempted from the prohibition.
A vendor who had operated a pushcart for less than the eight-year period brought suit
challenging the application of the grandfather provision as a denial of equal protection.
The Court held that only invidious discrimination would void such economic regulation,
and finding none, upheld the ordinance.
44. NOWAK, supra note 7, at 591.
45. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959). The question
presented in Allied concerned an exemption from a tax levy which applied only to non-
residents. The law dealt with merchandise or agricultural products warehoused in the
state; if the items in storage were used in a business in the state, they were subject to
19861
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2. Strict Scrutiny
The second standard of review under the equal protection
guarantee is referred to as strict scrutiny." This method of anal-
ysis is the converse of the deferential rational basis test and is
more complex.
Where rational basis affords legislative judgment the widest
discretion,47 strict scrutiny provides for a "narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality."' "s This "nar-
rower scope," a more searching inquiry into the legislative pur-
pose and the classifications drawn, describes the essence of strict
scrutiny. This method of analysis is employed when legislation
classifies people in terms of their ability to exercise a fundamen-
tal right,49 or when a classification distinguishes between persons
taxation; if the items belonged to a non-resident of Ohio and were held in a storage
warehouse for storage only, no tax was applied. The difference in the levy of a tax was
based upon a state of facts which could reasonably be conceived and since the distinction
was neither invidious nor arbitrary, it was not a prohibited classification under the equal
protection clause.
46. NOWAK, supra note 7, at 591.
47. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (criminal statute prohibiting an
unmarried interracial couple from living in or occupying the same room declared
invalid).
48. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The Carolene
Products case concerned regulation regarding the sale and shipment of "filled" milk;
since the legislation was one that affected ordinary commercial transactions, the rational
basis standard was applied. Chief Justice Stone stated that the "existence of facts sup-
porting the legislative judgment is to be presumed .. . [and] is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless the facts are made known to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators."
Id. at 152.
Chief Justice Stone's footnote to this statement delineated when a "narrower scope"
for the presumption of constitutionality is appropriate: (1) when legislation appears on
its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
10 amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
fourteenth amendment; (2) when legislation restricts those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, a more exacting
judicial scrutiny will be utilized, e.g., legislation which restricts the right to vote, re-
strains the dissemination of information, interferes with political organizations, or pro-
hibits peaceable assembly. Justice Stone added that similar considerations would enter
into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, national, or racial minori-
ties - or any other group considered "discrete and insular" - because they are special
conditions which tend to curtail the operation of the political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities and, therefore, call for a correspondingly more search-
ing judicial inquiry. Id. at n.4 (citations omitted).
49. See infra notes 55, 57, and 59.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/4
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based upon a "suspect" 50 basis. In order to survive this level of
scrutiny, the legislation in question must promote a compelling
state interest and the particular classification must be necessary
to promote that compelling state interest.51
Strict scrutiny acknowledges that political processes bur-
dening fundamental rights or suggestive of prejudice against cer-
tain minorities must be closely analyzed in order to preserve the
values of equality and liberty.52 The relationship of those classes
of persons deemed "suspect" and the operation of political
processes is close and complex.53 It is the existence of this close
relationship which moves the Court to invoke the strict scrutiny
standard, since the election of that standard allows the Court to
override the democratic processes and render an independent
decision regarding the correctness of legislative action.54
During the Warren era strict scrutiny was utilized to expand
the equal protection clause to protect indigent criminal sus-
50. The term "suspect" originated in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944): "[A1li legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. ... [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny .... Id.
at 216. The word race in that opinion referred to the Japanese. Despite the invocation of
strict scrutiny, Korematsu upheld the temporary exclusion and detention of persons of
Japanese ancestry; the opinion gave great deference to the combined war powers of the
President and Congress within the context of the needs of the nation at the start of
World War II.
Korematsu established three points for future analysis of classification based on race
or national origin: first, these classifications were "suspect," which meant they were
likely to be based on an impermissible purpose; second, they were to be subjected to the
"most rigid scrutiny"; and third, the classification would be invalid if based on racial
antagonism and upheld only if it were based on public necessity. NOWAK, supra note 7, at
633.
51. NOWAK, supra note 7, at 591-92.
52. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-6, at 1000.
53. Id. at 1002.
54. NOWAK, supra note 7, at 590.
55. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The issue presented in Douglas was
whether or not an indigent should receive the assistance of counsel on his first appeal as
a matter of right. California's practice regarding a requested appeal for an indigent per-
son was to submit the trial record for an ex parte proceeding in the district court (the
intermediate appeal court in California). The district court, looking only at the record,
decided whether the case had merit for appeal purposes; if the court decided that there
was no appealable issue, the indigent was without recourse. The proceeding was based
solely on the record; no briefs or oral arguments were allowed. The Supreme Court, not-
ing that federal courts honor requests for counsel regardless of what they think the mer-
its of the case may be, found the state practice "lacking that equality demanded by the
9
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pects,55 illegitimate children,"' the disenfranchised," or underen-
franchised, 8 and newly-resident applicants for state welfare. 9
New fundamental interests were also recognized - the right to
a criminal appeal, 0 the right to vote,61 and the right to travel.2
The legacy of the Warren Court was one of anticipation and
accomplishment. 3 Its last decade brought about a dramatic
change in the annals of equal protection, deemed the "new equal
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 357-58.
56. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). The question in Levy derived from a
claim on behalf of five illegitimate children under a Louisiana statute for the wrongful
death of their mother. The trial court and the court of appeals dismissed the suit, hold-
ing that a surviving "child" under the statute did not include an illegitimate child. The
denial was based on a policy of discouraging the birth of children out of wedlock while
encouraging morals and general welfare. The Supreme Court found that the denial of a
right to recovery created an invidious discrimination which contravened the equal pro-
tection clause. Id. at 70-72.
57. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1961). The Kramer Court con-
sidered a New York law which provided that residents in certain school districts who
were otherwise eligible to vote in state and federal elections, could vote in school district
elections only if they owned or leased taxable realty in that district or had children en-
rolled in the local public schools. Kramer was a bachelor who neither owned nor leased
real property. The Supreme Court required a compelling state interest to justify the ne-
cessity of such an exclusion but found none. Such careful examination was considered
necessary since the exercise of the right to vote constitutes the foundation of our repre-
sentative society, and any infringement has to be meticulously scrutinized. Id. at 626-28.
58. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). Avery concerned the voting pro-
cedures for electing commissioners to a county governing body in Texas. The county
consisted of four districts, each of which elected one commissioner to the governing
board; each commissioner cast one vote. The problem lay in the fact that, although each
district had an equal vote, one of the districts covered 95% of the county's population.
The Court found this apportionment to be inequitable since the equal protection clause
demands that those qualified to vote have the right to an equally effective voice in the
election process.
59. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). In Shapiro, the Court examined
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and District of Columbia statutes which denied welfare assis-
tance to residents who met all eligibility requirements except that they had not resided
within the jurisdictions for at least one year preceding their applications for assistance.
Each of the statutes was declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court rejected the ar-
gument that a "mere showing of a rational relationship" between the waiting period and
the states' objectives would suffice. Instead, the Court held that the act of moving from
one state to another was an exercise of a constitutional right. Any classification which
restricts such a right requires a showing of a compelling state interest. The argument
that the waiting periods facilitated budget predictability was rejected by the Court as
"wholly unfounded." Id. at 634.
60. Douglas, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). See supra note 55.
61. Kramer, 395 U.S. 621 (1961). See supra note 57.
62. Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See supra note 59.
63. Gunther, supra note 11, at 8.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/4
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protection," because of the interventionist approach of the strict
scrutiny standard.64 The list of interests designated as funda-
mental by the Warren Court is broad . 5 In the area of the ra-
tional basis standard, however, the choice of deference was pre-
served.6 6 The standards formed during these years were
dramatically polar. One commentator described minimal review
(rational basis) as a "virtual rubber stamp" and strict scrutiny
as a "virtual death blow."6
7
D. The Burger Court
Certain equal protection decisions of the Burger Court indi-
cate new dimensions within the standards of review inherited
from the Warren era. 8 These decisions involved questions of
gender discrimination and the rights or status of illegitimate
children. 70 Legislative classifications pertaining to these ques-
tions receive a "heightened" standard of review.
71
Reed v. Reed72 involved an Idaho statute which mandated
that males be preferred to females among those persons equally
entitled to become estate administrators. 73 Chief Justice Burger
announced for the first time that a classification based on sex
established a "classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. '7 4 In seeking a rational relationship between
the preference for males and the operation of the statute, Chief
Justice Burger stated that the classification "must be reasona-
64. Gunther described the strict scrutiny of the Warren Court as "strict in theory
and fatal in fact." Id.
65. See supra notes 55, 57 and 59.
66. See supra note 45. See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S.
802 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Gunther described the Warren
Court's rational basis standard as "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in
fact." Gunther, supra note 11, at 8.
67. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-30, at 1089.
68. TRIBE, supra note 28, §§ 16-30 to 16-31.
69. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
70. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Weber
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977).
71. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255 (1985).
72. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
73. Id. at 72.
74. Id. at 75.
1986]
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ble, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relationship to the object of the
legislation .... -"7 The Court concluded that a choice between
qualified persons "may not lawfully be mandated on the basis of
sex."97 6
Shortly thereafter, in Frontiero v. Richardson," Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall,
found implicit support in Reed to designate sex as an inherently
suspect classification, and thereby subject to close judicial scru-
tiny.78 Justice Brennan likened sex to race and national origin in
that it was "immutable ... determined solely by the accident of
birth .. . [and] bears no relation to ability to perform or contrib-
ute to society. '7 9 Under the close judicial scrutiny, the statutory
scheme in question was found to be constitutionally invalid,
since the government had conceded that the purpose of the clas-
sification was solely administrative convenience."0
The designation of sex as an inherently suspect classifica-
tion was not followed in Stanton v. Stanton,"1 since there the
Court found nothing rational8 2 in a statute requiring child sup-
port for males until the age of twenty-one, but requiring support
for female children only to the age of eighteen. 3 Stanton relied
on Reed, rather than Frontiero, in finding that a strict scrutiny
was unnecessary because rationality was lacking in the classifica-
75. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)) (em-
phasis added).
76. Id. at 77.
77. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). This case was brought to the Court under the due process
clause because it involved federal statutes 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1962) and 10 U.S.C. §§
1072, 1076 (1956). These statutes denied the status of "dependent" to spouses of uni-
formed servicewomen unless it could be proven that they were in fact dependent for one
half of their support. No such requirement was demanded of female spouses.
78. 411 U.S. at 682.
79. Id. at 686.
80. The Court stated that the demand of strict judicial scrutiny is not met by the
empirical argument that wives are frequently dependent on their husbands while hus-
bands are rarely dependent on their wives. Thus, "Congress might reasonably have con-
cluded that it would be both cheaper and easier simply conclusively to presume that
wives of male members are financially dependent upon their husbands, while burdening
female members with the task of establishing dependency in fact." Id. at 688-89.
81. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
82. Id. at 14.
83. Id. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953) (current version at UTAH CODE
ANN. § 15-2-1 (1976)).
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tion drawn.8 4
The 1976 decision in Craig v. Boren5 has been hailed by
one commentator as the first open adoption of a judicial stan-
dard of review based on intermediate scrutiny.86 The language
used in Craig to describe the requirement of the relationship be-
tween governmental objectives and the classifications employed
to achieve those objectives was that it must be "substantially
related" to serve "important governmental objectives. '8 7 Impor-
tantly, this is the language used in Reed which was decided
under the rational basis standard.
Illegitimate children have also benefited from the Burger
Court's solicitude. Although cases involving illegitimates have
never received the most exacting scrutiny, the rational basis
tests have not been "toothless."8 8 Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.a9 was the first case concerning illegitimate children
heard by the Burger Court. The case involved a claim for a
death benefit by the decedent's illegitimate children under Loui-
siana State workmen's compensation law. A restriction allowed
the receipt of such benefits by legitimate children, but not by
illegitimate children of the decedent. The Louisiana Supreme
Court had held that the restriction reflected the state's interest
in legitimate family relationships." The Burger Court found no
rational or significant relationship between the promotion of le-
gitimate family relationships and the wrongful death statute
which assigned inferior rights to illegitimate children.9 ' The
Court stated, "[Ilmposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing."92
84. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14.
85. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
86. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-25, at 1066.
87. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
88. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 510.
89. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
90. Id. at 173.
91. Id. at 175.
92. Id. The Warren Court in deciding Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) used
nearly identical language: "Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the na-
ture of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. . . . [1]t is invidious to discriminate
against them when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the
19861
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Two later cases, Mathews v. Lucas'3 and Lalli v. Lalli,"4
found permissible classifications relating to illegitimates. Ma-
thews, decided under the due process clause because it con-
cerned federal legislation, upheld a provision in the Social Se-
curity Act' 5 which required illegitimate children to prove
dependency in order to receive survivors' benefits. Legitimate
children were accorded a presumption of dependency." The
Court held that the required showing of dependency for illegiti-
mates was a reasonable way of qualifying for this entitlement.9
The petitioner in La li challenged a requirement that paternity
be declared in a judicial proceeding some time before the fa-
ther's death in order for an illegitimate child to inherit by intes-
tacy. The Court held that the requirement was "substantially re-
lated to the important state interest of the orderly distribution
of property at death."' 8
Another case, Trimble v. Gordon," centered on a question
very similar to the one presented in Lalli. The Trimble Court,
however, held that the statute in question was invalid; the rea-
soning in the case elucidates previous and subsequent holdings
regarding illegitimates.'0 0
The Illinois Probate Act 10' challenged in Trimble allowed
illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from
their mothers. Although the appellant in Trimble had been de-
termined to be the decedent's child in a state court paternity
action, she was still barred from inheriting unless her parents
had subsequently married. 02 The Court, citing Weber, acknowl-
edged that although the standard to be applied was that of ra-
tional basis, the scrutiny would be stricter when statutory classi-
harm that was done the mother." Id. at 72. The statute in Levy also had as one of its
goals discouraging the birth of children out of wedlock. The Louisiana Court of Appeals
did not consider illegitimate children to be persons. Id. at 70.
93. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
94. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 16(h)(3) (1973). See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
96. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 516.
97. Id. at 507.
98. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 275-76.
99. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
100. Id. at 776.
101. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973).
102. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 764-65.
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fications approach sensitive and fundamental rights,103 and,
therefore, it is "not a toothless one.' 10 4 The Court reiterated
that it found illegitimacy to be analogous in many respects to
the personal characteristics that have been held to be suspect,
although it declined to exert its most exacting scrutiny.'0
The statute in Trimble, however, was different from those
in La li and Mathews, because it constituted what the Court
viewed as an absolute bar to the illegitimate child's right to in-
herit; it provided no "alternative" means for the illegitimate
child to further her claim.'10 The state's interest in Trimble was
similar to Louisiana's in Weber - the promotion of legitimate
family relationships. As in Weber, it was rejected as insufficient
to justify a classification based on status at birth.'0 7
Zobel v. Williams'08 and United States Department of Ag-
riculture v. Moreno'0 9 are further examples of the Burger
Court's distinct use of the rational basis standard."10 The issue
in Zobel arose from Alaska's plan for distribution of oil profits to
its residents. The plan discriminated among citizens on the basis
of duration of residency."' This statute was enacted following
103. Id. at 767.
104. Id. (citing Mathews, 427 U.S. at 510).
105. Id. at 707.
106. The statutes in both LaWi and Mathews did not wholly prevent the illegitimate
child from receiving a benefit. In both cases the Court permitted the government to
place burdens on illegitimates which were at least rationally related to legitimate govern-
mental interests. See generally TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-23.
The fact that the child could petition the courts on the issues of paternity and child
support, but could not petition to establish her right to inherit, was found to be the
constitutional defect of the Act. The same adjudication that established the paternity of
the child and ordered her support "should be equally sufficient to establish . . . [her]
right to claim a child's share of ... [the] estate, for the State's interest in the accurate
and efficient disposition of property at death would not be compromised in any way....
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772.
107. The Court in Trimble held the following: "[W]e have expressly considered and
rejected the argument that a state may attempt to influence the actions of men and
women by imposing sanctions on the children .... 430 U.S. at 769 (This was also the
holding in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See supra note 92.).
108. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
109. 413 U.S. 528 (1982).
110. Gunther stated in 1971 that: "The Court is prepared to use the clause as an
interventionist tool without resorting to ... strict scrutiny .. " Gunther, supra note 11,
at 12.
111. The Court stated that:
The Alaska statute does not simply make distinctions between native-born
15
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the discovery of oil in 1967 on state-owned land in the Prudhoe
Bay area of Alaska. The statute established a "Permanent
Fund" into which the state must deposit at least twenty-five
percent of its oil income each year.11 2 Although the Court cited
Shapiro v. Thompson," 3 in which a residency requirement for
welfare benefits was invalidated on the basis of a strict scrutiny
analysis, it found Alaska's scheme unacceptable at the minimum
rationality level." 4
Moreno involved the distribution of federally-sponsored
food stamps which, with certain exceptions, excluded from par-
ticipation any household containing an individual who was unre-
lated to any other member of the household." 5 Moreno, a fifty-
six year old diabetic, had moved in with an indigent family in
order to share common living expenses."' The family's allowing
her to continue to live with them would have deprived them of
the food stamps by reason of the statute's exclusion of non-re-
lated persons." 7
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, examined the legis-
lative history of the Act to discover a legitimate governmental
purpose. Justice Brennan found from the history of the exclu-
sion that it "was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and
'hippie communes' from participating in the food stamp pro-
gram."" 8 This purpose could not be sustained because, accord-
ing to Justice Brennan, "[I]f the constitutional conception of
'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politi-
Alaskans and those who migrate to Alaska from other states; it does not discrimi-
nate only against those who have recently exercised the right to travel, as did the
statute involved in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Alaska statute
also discriminates among long-time residents and even native-born residents. For
example, a person born in Alaska in 1962 would have received $100 less than
someone who was born in the State in 1960. Of course the native Alaskan born in
1962 would also receive $100 less than the person who moved to the State in 1960.
Zobel, 457 U.S. at 59 n.5.
112. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 57.
113. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See supra note 59.
114. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 61.
115. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529. See also The Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. §
2012(e) (1964) (amended 1971, 1972, 1973).
116. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 534.
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cally unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest."" 9 Another asserted purpose, the prevention of
fraud, was disposed of in a similar manner. 120 The classification
was deemed imprecise and devoid of any rational basis.1 2'
E. Identifying Intermediate Review
The "sharper focus" described by Justice Powell in Craig v.
Boren,'22 has been described as a form of review "poised be-
tween the largely toothless invocation of minimum rationality
and the nearly fatal invocation of strict scrutiny .... 23 The
small sampling of cases considered above is indicative of a closer
look and shows an independent determination by the Court of
what are permissible classifications or interests of the
government.
It is evident that in this form of review the Court places a
high priority on assessing the objectives served by the chal-
lenged legislation. These objectives must be important, not com-
pelling; the objectives of administrative convenience 24 or re-
duced workload in the probate courts1 2 5 were found insufficient
to sustain the use of overt gender classifications. The orderly
disposition of property at death, however, did meet the Court's
criteria.12 6 Importance was also demanded for the interest of the
individuals involved. A child's right to support from his par-
ent' 127 and his right to inherit,128 while not fundamental, were
deemed important enough to invalidate the statutory classifica-
tions which inhibited these rights.
29
The notion of reasonableness, "having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation," ' 0 was present in all the
above-cited gender classification cases decided under the banner
119. Id.
120. Id. at 537.
121. Id. at 538.
122. 429 U.S. at 211 n. * (Powell, J., concurring).
123. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-30, at 1082.
124. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
125. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
126. LalLi, 439 U.S. at 259 (1978). See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
127. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14-15. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
128. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
129. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 17; Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776.
130. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
1986]
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of rational scrutiny."3 ' With respect to illegitimate children, any
classification whose purpose was to promote legitimate family
relations was deemed to be unfair. 132 Imposing disabilities on the
illegitimates in order to condemn the irresponsible liaisons of
the parents was considered illogical, unjust, and "contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.' 33 Thus,
the substantial relationship requirement demands a "closer fit"
between purpose and means than is required under the minimal
rationality test."s4 The Court, by utilizing this language or this
test, has refrained from expanding the "suspect" classes,1 35 while
affording some protection to groups it considers worthy of
solicitude.136
III. The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions Regarding the
Mentally Retarded
The Supreme Court has recently decided two important
cases concerning the rights of retarded individuals. The first,
131. Craig, 429 U.S. 190; Stanton, 421 U.S. 7; Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677; Reed, 404
U.S. 71.
132. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776; Weber, 406 U.S. at 173.
133. Weber, 406 U.S. at 175.
134. TRiBE, supra note 28, § 16-30, at 1083. The important function of state and
local governments to promote health and safety was deemed "unduly tenuous" to the
regulation prohibiting the sale of beer to males in Craig, 429 U.S. at 202.
135. "We find it unnecessary in this case to decide whether a classification based on
sex is inherently suspect." Stanton, 421 U.S. at 13. "[Illlegitimacy is analogous in many
respects to the personal characteristics that have been held to be suspect .... We never-
theless concluded that the analogy was not sufficient to require 'our most exact scru-
tiny.'" Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767 (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 505-06).
136. Gunther's examination of the 1971 term of the Supreme Court included "tenta-
tive conclusions" about what he saw and what it might portend for the equal protection
doctrine. The cases examined by Gunther attest to his accuracy and may illuminate the
decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. Those "conclusions" were that:
(1) The Burger Court is reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection,
although its best established ingredients retain vitality. (2) There is mounting dis-
content with the rigid two-tier formulations of the Warren Court's equal protec-
tion doctrine. (3) The Court is prepared to use the clause as an interventionist
tool without resorting to the strict scrutiny language of the new equal protection.
The first two themes confirm Burger Court trends observable before last term.
The third theme - equal protection bite without 'strict scrutiny' - is a surpris-
ing new development that warrants special attention in the search for reasoned
bases of constitutional evolution on a changing Court.
Gunther, supra note 11, at 12-24.
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Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,137 involved
an interpretation of the term "appropriate treatment" as it was
used in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act.13 At issue in the case was the "bill of rights" provi-
sion.13 9 Advocates for the retarded argued that this provision
created a substantial right to treatment designed to maximize
developmental potential in a setting that was the "least restric-
tive of the person's personal liberty." 40
The Court held that the Act was a "policy" statement with
financial incentives to induce the states to provide better care
and treatment for retarded individuals. The Court found no "re-
quirement" in the Act to provide certain kinds of treatment.1 4 1
It was, according to the Court, a "typical funding statute. '14 2
In Youngberg v. Romeo 3 the Court considered, for the first
time, the substantive due process rights of involuntarily commit-
ted mentally retarded persons.144 The respondent, Nicholas Ro-
meo, was a profoundly retarded thirty-three year old man with
the mental capacity of an eighteen-month-old child. His IQ was
137. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. III) (current version at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
6000-6083 (1983 & Supp. 1985)) [hereinafter referred to as Act]. The Act is one of the
federal-state grant programs whereby the federal government provides financial assis-
tance to participating states to aid them in creating programs to care for and treat the
developmentally disabled. (Retarded persons were among those defined as such when the
Act was originally proposed.) Like other federal-state cooperative programs, the Act is
voluntary and the states are given the choice of complying with the conditions set forth
or foregoing the benefits of federal funding. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 11.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. III). The relevant parts of the Act were:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treat-
ment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental
disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the
person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the per-
son's personal liberty.
Id. § 6010 (1), (2).
140. "Least restrictive setting" refers to the goal of providing services for the handi-
capped in the most "normal" setting. An institution is considered the most restrictive
setting; a classroom in a public school for special education students is less restrictive. A
handicapped person who is taught solely in classrooms where other non-special educa-
tion students are taught is in the least restrictive setting.
141. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 31.
142. Id. at 22.
143. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
144. Id. at 314.
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between eight and ten; he was unable to talk and lacked the
most basic of self-help skills.1 45 He had been committed to
Pennhurst State School and Hospital by his mother, through
proper procedures, at the age of twenty-six.146
The Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Powell, ini-
tially held that the mere fact that Romeo had been committed
under proper procedures did not deprive him of all substantial
liberty interests under the fourteenth amendment.1 4 7 Addition-
ally, the Court stated that Romeo had a right to safe condi-
tions,1 4 8 as well as freedom from bodily restraint, 149 but these
interests were "not absolute" in the sense that the hospital's
right to protect other residents was as strong as Romeo's
rights.1 50
Romeo's assertion of a right to "minimally adequate habili-
tation"'' 5 was more troubling for the Court.1 52 The Court de-
fined minimal training as that which would be "reasonable in
light of respondent's liberty interests in safety and freedom from
unreasonable restraints.' ' 53
The Court stated that the determination of what was rea-
sonable under the circumstances was the province of qualified
professionals, 54 and that the Court would not interfere with a
professional judgment unless it was "such a substantial depar-
ture from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not
base the decision on such a judgment.' 55 Finally, the Court
commented that: "It may well be unreasonable not to provide
training when training could significantly reduce the need for re-
145. Id. at 309.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 315.
148. Id. The state had conceded in its brief that Romeo had a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. Id. at n.17.
149. Youngberg, 451 U.S. at 316. Justice Powell noted that the claims to safe condi-
tions and freedom from bodily restraint are not extinguished even when one is confined
for penal purposes. Id. at 315-16.
150. Id. at 320.
151. Habilitation refers to training and development of needed skills; the range can
encompass self-help skills to employment training.
152. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316.
153. Id. at 322.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 323.
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straints or the likelihood of violence."' ' 6
IV. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
A. Facts
In July 1980, Jan Hannah purchased a building at 201
Featherston Street in the city of Cleburne, Texas, with the in-
tention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (CLC) for
the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded.'
57 It
was anticipated that the group home would house thirteen re-
tarded men and women who would be under the constant super-
vision of CLC staff members.'5 CLC planned to comply with
applicable state and federal regulations. "
The city informed CLC that a special use permit would be
required because the city had concluded that the group home
should be classified as a "hospital for the insane or feeble-
minded"',6 under a zoning ordinance covering the area in which
the proposed home would be located.'1' After holding a public
156. Id. at 324. Justice Blackmun stated in the concurrence that habilitation should
at least consist of the training necessary to preserve these basic self-care skills possessed
upon entry to institutions, or such training necessary to keep those skills from deterio-
rating. The concurrence went on to note that "for many mentally retarded people, the
difference between the capacity to do things for themselves within an institution and
total dependence on the institution for all of their needs is as much liberty as they ever
will know." Id. at 327 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
157. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3252 (1985).
Hannah was the vice-president and part owner of CLC; both Hannah and CLC will be
referred to as CLC.
158. Id. The house had four bedrooms and two baths with a half bath to be added.
159. Id. It was anticipated that the home would be operated as a private care facil-
ity for the mentally retarded. Id. at n.2.
160. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252.
161. The zoning ordinance provided that:
The site of the home is in an area zoned 'R-3', an 'Apartment House District.
... Section 8 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance, in pertinent part, allows the fol-
lowing uses in an R-3 district:
'1. Any use permitted in District R-2.
'2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
'3. Boarding and lodging houses.
'4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
'5. Apartment hotels.
'6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or aged,
other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts.
'7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is carried on
as a business.
1986]
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hearing on CLC's application, the city council voted three to one
to deny a special use permit.1 62 The council members considered
the following factors important in denying the permit: the atti-
tude of a majority of owners of property located within 200 feet
of the proposed home; the location of a junior high school across
the street from it; concern for the fears of elderly residents of
the neighborhood; the size of the home and the number of peo-
ple to be housed; concern over the legal responsibility of CLC
for any actions which the mentally retarded residents might
take; and the home's location on a 500-year flood plain.1 3
After exhausting administrative remedies, CLC sued for in-
junctive relief and damages in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas. They were joined in the suit
by the Johnson County Association for Retarded Citizens1 64 and
Advocacy, Inc.16 5
B. Procedural History
1. District Court
At the district court level,"" CLC asserted that the zoning
ordinance was invalid on its face, and as applied, because it dis-
criminated against the mentally retarded in violation of the
'8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal institutions.
'9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses .. ' (emphasis
added).
Section 16 of the ordinance specifies the uses for which a special use permit is
required. ... All special use permits are limited to one year, and each applicant is
required 'to obtain the signatures of the property owners within two hundred
(200) feet of the property to be used.'
Id. at n.3 (citations omitted).
162. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3253. The city's Planning and Zoning Commission had
earlier held a hearing and had also voted to deny the permit. Id. at n.4.
163. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984).
(A 500-year flood plain means that the area is in danger of a flood once every 500 years.
Id. at 194.)
164. Id. Johnson County Association for Retarded Citizens was found to lack stand-
ing to prosecute the suit. See Id. at 203.
165. Id. at 195. Advocacy, Inc. is a nonprofit corporation that provides legal services
to the developmentally disabled. "CLC" will include Advocacy, Inc. when referred to
herein.
166. All references to the district court action are to synopses contained in either
the circuit court or Supreme Court opinion. The district court opinion is unreported.
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equal protection clause.1 67 After a bench trial, the district court
held the zoning ordinance and its application constitutional.1 68
The district court, applying the minimum level of scrutiny
applicable to equal protection claims, concluded that the zoning
ordinance was rationally related to the city's legitimate interests.
Those interests were identified as concern for the legal responsi-
bility of CLC and its residents, the safety and fears of residents
in the neighborhood, and the number of people to reside in the
home.16 9 The district court also found that the use would be per-
mitted under the zoning ordinance but for the character of the
potential residents. The court acknowledged that the city coun-
cil's decision was motivated primarily by the fact that the resi-
dents of the home would be mentally retarded persons.17 0
2. The Court of Appeals
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals17 ' reversed the district
court, stating that "[t]he real problem with the Cleburne ordi-
nance is that it denies equal protection both facially and as ap-
plied. 17 2 The court, for the first time,17 addressed the "proper
characterization of mentally retarded persons for Equal Protec-
tion analysis,'17 4 and concluded that the appropriate level of
analysis was intermediate review, 17 requiring that the classifica-
tion serve important governmental objectives and be substan-
tially related to the achievement of those objectives.17 6
The circuit court identified several characteristics of the re-
tarded to support its invocation of heightened level of review.
167. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3253.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The district court also rejected CLC's other claim that the city had violated
due process by improperly delegating its zoning powers to the owners of adjoining prop-
erty. The court of appeals did not address this argument, and it was not raised at the
Supreme Court level. Id. at n.5.
171. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984).
172. Id. at 195.
173. Id. at 196.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. Judge Goldberg, author of the opinion, relied on language in Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), and L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-31, at 1090 (1978), in designating his analysis as
"intermediate."
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While citing the indicia of suspect classes, as articulated in re-
cent Supreme Court decisions,'" the court found that the re-
tarded were: (1) the victims of discrimination that was likely to
reflect deep prejudice;178 (2) had historically been subjected to
unfair, often grotesque, mistreatment, often segregated in re-
mote, stigmatizing institutions; 79 (3) lack political power; 80 and
(4) have an immutable condition.' 8' The court did not conclude,
however, that the retarded were a full-fledged suspect class,1 8 '
since mental retardation is a condition that is a relevant distinc-
tion to some legitimate state interests such as school programs
177. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 196-97 (5th Cir.
1984). Judge Goldberg cited San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973), in which the Court considered the traditional indicia of suspectness: "[whether]
the class is ... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Id. at 28. He
also cited Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982):
Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice
rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. Legisla-
tion predicated on such prejudices is easily recognized as incompatible with the
constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is
entitled to equal justice under the law.
Id. at 216 n.14.
Judge Goldberg finally stated that "if membership in the minority class is immuta-
ble, the Supreme Court is more likely to give the class special protection." Cleburne
Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Parham
v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979)).
178. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir.
1984).
179. Id. (stating the fact that the retarded were universally denied admittance into
public schools in the United States and that they were subject to a eugenics movement
whereby the retarded were sought to be eradicated entirely through euthanasia and com-
pulsory sterilization). See also Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972);
Pennsylvania Assoc. of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa.
1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (landmark cases which outlawed the
classifying of retarded children as uneducable and excluding them from public schools,
respectively). Judge Goldberg noted also that once technical terms for various degrees of
retardation, e.g., "idiots," "imbeciles," "morons," have become popular terms of derision.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1984).
180. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 194 (5th Cir.
1984). "[A]s of 1979 most states disqualified mentally retarded individuals from voting."
Id. See generally Note, Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 88 YALiE L.J. 1644
(1979). Texas excludes "idiots" and "lunatics" from voting. TEx. CONsT. art. VI, § 1; TEX.
ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 5.01 (Vernon 1982).
181. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir.
1984).
182. Id.
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/4
CITY OF CLEBURNE
or qualifications for employment.' 83
The court of appeals reiterated its conclusion that height-
ened scrutiny was particularly appropriate because the zoning
ordinance withheld a benefit which was "important," though not
fundamental;' 84 the exclusion of group homes from Cleburne op-
erated to prevent mentally retarded persons from assimilating
into and contributing to society. 185 Moreover, it was held that
the ordinance did not substantially further any important gov-
ernmental interest; the correspondence between the relevance
and the interests was not sufficiently close. 86 The ordinance
would have permitted the same number of occupants if they
were not mentally retarded 87 and traffic flow would not have
been hampered since retarded persons neither drive nor have
visitors in disproportionate numbers.188 According to the court,
the record also failed to show that the ordinance protected the
serenity of the neighborhood or shielded the neighbors from
harm.1 89 The goal of safety from fire and other dangers was
found to be similarly remote. 90 The proximity of the junior high
school was seen as a minimal danger, since retarded children at-
tended the school.' 91 The court could not accept the possible
hostility of the "normal students" as a substantial concern. 92 In
response to the city's concern over the legal responsibility of
CLC for any actions which the mentally retarded residents
might take, the court stated that the goal of insuring legal re-
sponsibility for potential actions was not sufficiently important
because there had been no reason proffered why the retardates
alone must prove their financial solvency to live in the neighbor-
hood.' 93 Finally, the argument that the home would be on a 500-
183. Id.
184. Id. at 199 (citing TamE, supra note 28, § 16-31, at 1089-90).
185. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir.
1984).
186. Id. at 200 (citing Tam. supra note 28, § 16-30, at 1083).
187. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir.
1984).
188. Id. at 200-01.
189. Id. at 201.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 202.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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year flood plain was found to be "somewhat" strained.194 In
short, none of the reasons for denying the Featherston permit
"substantially served an important government interest.' '1 95
Thus, the court concluded that the application of the ordinance
violated equal protection. 19
A rehearing en banc was denied, with six judges dissenting
in an opinion urging that the court reconsider the adoption of a
heightened standard of review. 197
C. The Supreme Court
1. The Majority
The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals on
the level of scrutiny to be applied and on the designation of the
mentally retarded as a class of persons deserving a heightened
scrutiny. Nevertheless, it concluded that even under the lesser,
minimum level of scrutiny, the zoning ordinance was invalid as
applied in this case.'98
The majority opinion 9 began with a summary of the stan-
dards of review available to the Court under the equal protec-
tion clause, stating that the "general rule" in deciding an equal
protection question was the rational basis test, 00 and further
noting that wide latitude should be given the state when the leg-
islation in question involves social or economic policies.20' The
Court stated that the general rule gives way, however, when
race, alienage, or national origin is the basis of classification, or
when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by the
Constitution.0 2 Under such conditions, legislation will be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny, and will be sustained only if the classifi-
cations are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984),
reh'g denied, 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984) (Garwood, J., dissenting).
198. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
199. Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. Id. at 3252.
200. Id. at 3254.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 3255.
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interest.203
A heightened standard of review204 was acknowledged by
the majority as proper for legislation involving gender-based
classifications because such classifications "very likely reflect
out-moded notions. 20 5 The test for this standard was identified
as requiring that the classification bear a substantial relation-
ship' to a legitimate state interest.0 6
Citing Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,07 the
majority crystalized the posture it would take regarding the re-
tarded when it compared them to the aged,'2 0 8 a class to which
the Court has declined to apply the standard of heightened re-
view. 09 The majority then stated that the lesson of Murgia was
that:
[W]here individuals in the group affected by a law have distin-
guishing characteristics relevant to interests the state has author-
ity to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they
should be in our federal system and with our respect for the sepa-
ration of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to
whether, how and to what extent those interests should be pur-
sued. In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a
rational means to serve a legitimate end.210
With this "lesson" as background, the majority concluded "for
several reasons that the court of appeals erred in holding mental
retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more ex-
acting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded eco-
nomic and social legislation. "211
The majority next listed what it considered "distinguishing
characteristics," to wit: those who are mentally retarded have a
reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday
world;21 2 and the range within the class itself' 3 varies from those
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
208. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 3255-56.
212. Id. at 3256.
213. The Court explained that:
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whose disability is not immediately evident to those for whom
there must be constant care.21 4 The state's interests in providing
for the range of disabilities among the group - from perhaps
total residential care to educational programming within a pub-
lic school - were deemed legitimate by the Court.215
As "[hieightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive
judgments, 2 1 6 the majority concluded that such substantive
judgments should be made by legislators as guided by qualified
professionals. 21 ' The Court further postured that the "ill-in-
formed opinions" of the judiciary were inappropriate when the
classification dealt with mental retardation.21 8
A second reason advanced by the majority for declining to
implement heightened scrutiny was "the distinctive legislative
response, both national and state, to the plight of those who are
mentally retarded .... ,"219 The Court stated that this "belies a
continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for
more intrusive oversight by the judiciary. '220 In support of this
position the Court cited the Developmental Disabilities Assis-
tance and Bill of Rights Act221 and the Education of the Handi-
Mentally retarded individuals fall into four distinct categories. The vast ma-
jority - approximately 89% - are classified as 'mildly' retarded, meaning that
their IQ is between 50 and 70. Approximately 6% percent [sic] are 'moderately'
retarded, with IQs between 35 and 50. The remaining two categories are 'severe'
(IQs of 20 to 35) and 'profound' (IQs below 20). These last two categories together
account for about 5% of the mentally retarded population ....
Mental retardation is not defined by reference to intelligence or IQ alone,
however. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) has defined
mental retardation as 'significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning ex-
isting concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
developmental period.' . . . 'Deficits in adaptive behavior' are limitations on gen-
eral ability to meet the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence,
and social responsibility expected for an individual's age level and cultural group.
... Mental retardation is caused by a variety of factors, some genetic, some envi-
ronmental, and some unknown ....
Id. at n.9 (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 3256.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. This "professional judgment" is the same standard iterated in Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). This standard is discussed in Part III.
218. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3256.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010 (1), (2). The substance of this act was the issue in
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capped Act.2 2 The former, according to the Court, has provided
the retarded with the right to receive appropriate treatment,
services and habilitation in a setting that is least restrictive of
their personal liberty. 23 The latter conditioned federal funds on
the state's assurance that "retarded children will enjoy an edu-
cation that, 'to the maximum extent appropriate,' is integrated
withi that of non-mentally retarded children. ' '2 24 The majority
concluded that such legislation "occurred and survived with
public support ... [which] negates any claim that the mentally
retarded are politically powerless in the sense that they have no
ability to attract the attention of the law makers. '22 5
The majority next gave its reasons for declining to set out
on the course of deeming the retarded quasi-suspect.2 26 The
Court reasoned that if it were done for the retarded "it would be
difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a variety of other
groups ... who cannot themselves mandate the desired legisla-
tive responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from
at least part of the public at large. ' 2 7 The Court gave as exam-
ples of such other groups the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill
and the infirm.228
The majority went on to state that regardless of its failure
to designate the retarded as a quasi-suspect class, the retarded
"have and retain their substantive constitutional rights, 22 9 in-
cluding the right to equal protection.2 30 Zobel v. Williams"1 and
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno3 2 (cases in
which the rational basis standard was sufficient to invalidate the
questioned legislation) were cited as support for the assertion
that rational basis review afforded adequate protection for the
Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
222. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1461 (1970) (current version at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1454
(1982 & Supp. 1985)).
223. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3256.
224. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1970)).
225. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257.
226. Id. at 3258.
227. Id. at 3257-58.
228. Id. at 3258.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
232. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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retarded. 3 3 "This standard, we believe, affords government the
latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed to assist the
retarded in realizing their full potential, and to freely and effi-
ciently engage in activities that burden the retarded in what is
essentially an incidental manner."'23
The Court next considered the issue of the validity of the
zoning ordinanco insofar as it required a special use permit for
homes for the mentally retarded. 5 The Court stated that the
preferred course of adjudication under an equal protection anal-
ysis is to inquire into the application of the law. When a decision
can be made on this narrower basis, the Court can avoid the un-
necessarily broad constitutional judgment of facial invalidity. 236
Acknowledging that there were "differences" presented by men-
tally retarded individuals, the Court stated that those differ-
ences are "irrelevant unless the Featherston home and those
who would occupy it would threaten legitimate interests of the
city in a way that other permitted uses such as boarding houses
and hospitals would not. '23 7 Finding no evidence in the record to
support such a threat by the presence of retarded individuals,
the Court held that the ordinance was invalid as applied. 3 '
The Court then examined the reasons given by the city at
the district court level to support its denial of the permit. Sin-
gling out what the city had characterized as "negative attitude
of the majority of the property owners located within 200 feet of
the Featherston facility, '23 9 the Court stated "mere negative at-
titudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for
233. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. A finding that an ordinance is facially invalid means that by its language
alone it violates equal protection. This is distinct from a finding of invalidity as applied
to the particular circumstances. A facially invalid statute (or law or ordinance) is de-
clared unconstitutional in toto; it must be replaced or removed entirely from its context.
A statute (or a section of one) found to be a violation of equal protection as applied may
remain intact, but it may not be applied under the circumstances or against the group
that a court has held to be offensive to the Constitution. See generally Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 9.
237. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3259. See supra note 161 for a list of the uses permitted
in this zone.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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treating a home for the mentally retarded differently .... ,,240
The Court went on to say "it is plain that the electorate as a
whole ... could not order city action violative of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause ... and the City may not avoid the strictures of
that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objections of some
fraction of the body politic. '24 ' In finally disposing of this con-
cern the Court quoted its language in Palmore v. Sidoti:4 2 "Pri-
vate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law can-
not, directly or indirectly, give them effect. '2 43
The majority also disposed of the question regarding the
home's location. The proximity of the home across from a junior
high school and the feared harassment from students was an ex-
ample of "vague, undifferentiated fears . . . again permitting
some portion of the community to validate what would other-
wise be an equal protection violation. ' 24 4 The Court reacted sim-
ilarly to the location of the home on a flood plain. The presence
of nursing homes or homes for convalescents was seen as
presenting hazards of equal importance; these uses, however, re-
quired no special use permit.24 5 The concerns for legal responsi-
bility for the residents and the number of persons occupying the
home were also found to be groundless.24 e
The majority elucidated its conclusions stating "[tihe short
of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to
rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded. 247
240. Id.
241. Id. (citations omitted).
242. 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984). This case involved a custody dispute between the par-
ents of a minor child. The mother, who was Caucasian, was divorced from the father but
had retained custody of the child. She subsequently married a black man. The father
brought the action to recover custody, asserting that the mother's interracial marriage
was unacceptable to him and to society. The Court found that such a bias was not suffi-
cient grounds for removal of the child from her natural mother. Id. at 1882 (emphasis in
original).
243. Id. at 1882.
244. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3259.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 3260.
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2. Concurring Opinion of Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens limited his concurring opinion to a discus-
sion of the character of judicial review under the equal protec-
tion clause; he was joined in this opinion by Chief Justice
Burger.24
Justice Stevens began by addressing the court of appeals'
discussion of the standards of review, specifically its delineation
of three standards.2 4 The Justice stated that: "The Court of Ap-
peals disposed of this case as if a critical question to be decided
were which of the three clearly defined standards of equal pro-
tection review should be applied to a legislative classification
discriminating against the mentally retarded. 2 50 According to
Justice Stevens, the "cases have not delineated three - or even
one or two - such well defined standards. Rather our cases re-
flect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifica-
tions which have been explained in opinions by terms ranging
from 'strict scrutiny' at one extreme to 'rational basis' at the
other. 2 51 In Justice Stevens' view, these "so called" standards
do not explain the decisional process.2 5
Justice Stevens stated that the tiered analysis of equal pro-
tection 253 "does not describe a completely logical method of de-
ciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to
explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a rea-
sonably consistent fashion. ' 25 In discussing the rational basis
test, Justice Stevens commented that, to him, the word rational
"includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must al-
ways characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to
govern impartially. 2 5 5 Justice Stevens stated that the rational
basis test, properly understood, would invalidate most racial
248. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 3260-61.
250. Id. at 3260. Justice Stevens identified these as "rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest," "somewhat heightened review," and "strict scrutiny." Id. at n.1.
251. Id. at 3260-61.
252. Id. at 3261.
253. Id. Justice Stevens is referring to the "two-tiered" approach of either strict
scrutiny or rational basis which was prominent during the Warren era. See supra note 38
and accompanying text. See generally Gunther, supra note 11.
254. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting his own concur-
ring opinion in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976)).
255. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261.
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classifications and validate most economic classifications.5 6 Ac-
cordingly, that test would produce differing results when ques-
tions regarding alienage, gender, or illegitimacy were considered
"because the characteristics of these groups are sometimes rele-
vant and sometimes irrelevant to a valid public purpose, or,
more specifically, to the purpose that the challenged laws pur-
portedly intended to serve."25 7
Justice Stevens characterized the discrimination against the
mentally retarded in the case at bar as the result of irrational
fears of neighboring property owners. 58 However, he did not be-
lieve that every law which places the retarded in a special class
should be presumptively irrational.2  Justice Stevens, therefore,
concurred in the majority's decision which was reached on a ra-
tional basis test without a designation of suspect or quasi-sus-
pect for the retarded as a class.
3. The Dissent/Concurrence
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Black-
mun, concurred in the result of the decision, but dissented be-
cause he could not agree with the way in which the Court
reached its result.260 Justice Marshall described the Court's in-
validation of the zoning ordinance as it applied to the retarded
in this case as a "novel and truncated remedy,"26 1 because it was
not invalidated on its face. 2 Justice Marshall could not accept
the Court's disclaimer that it did not engage in a more exacting
standard than an ordinary rational basis review. " 3
On the question of the type of review utilized by the major-
ity, Justice Marshall stated, "To be sure, the Court does not la-
bel its handiwork heightened scrutiny . . . But however la-
beled, the rational basis test invoked today is most assuredly not
the rational basis test" previously articulated by the Court.2
256. Id. at 3262.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 3264 (citations omitted).
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According to Justice Marshall, the Court had refused to ac-
knowledge that something more than minimal rationality was at
work, and this refusal would produce two unfortunate effects.' 65
First, "[t]he suggestion that the traditional rational basis test
allows this sort of searching inquiry creates precedent for this
Court and lower courts to subject economic and commercial
classifications to similar and searching 'ordinary' rational basis
review .... ", Second, by failing to articulate the factors that
justify the rational basis review applied, "the Court provides no
principled foundation for determining when more searching in-
quiry is to be invoked. ' 261 These two effects, Justice Marshall
believed, would leave lower courts in the dark as to what stan-
dard to apply in equal protection decisions, and makes the Su-
preme Court "unaccountable" for its decisions to employ or not
to employ certain levels of scrutiny.26 8
Justice Marshall went on to delineate the particular factors
which justified the invalidation of the zoning ordinance. First,
Marshall termed the right to "establish a home" as one of the
"fundamental liberties embraced by the Due Process Clause. "269
Furthermore, for the retarded, these homes have become the
"primary means" by which they can enter life in the commu-
nity,270 and therefore, excluding group homes deprived the re-
tarded of much of what constitutes "human freedom and fulfill-
ment - the ability to form bonds and take part in the life of a
community. '27 1
Second, Justice Marshall found that the mentally retarded
have been subject to a" 'lengthy and tragic history,'.., of segre-
gation and discrimination that can only be called grotesque. "212
Marshall termed their history as one whose "virulence and big-
otry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim
265. Id. at 3265.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 3266 (citations omitted).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Marshall described the history as including a re-
gime of state-mandated segregation and degredation to which the retarded were sub-
jected in the early 20th century because they were thought of as a menace to society and
responsible for many of our social problems. Id.
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Crow." 27 3
It was this combination of the importance of establishing a
home and the history of discrimination that caused Marshall to
call for invocation of a "searching scrutiny 2 74 - one which
would seek substantial and important relationships between leg-
islation and classifications.
Justice Marshall's final criticism concerned the substance of
the Court's equal protection analysis.2 75 He characterized the
Court's analysis as placing the formal label of review above the
careful identification of the interests at stake.2 76 Marshall stated
that because the Court focused obsessively on the appropriate
label to give its standard of review, it ignored the principle that
"classifications based on mental retardation must be carefully
examined to assure that they do not rest on impermissible as-
sumptions or false stereotypes regarding individual ability and
need. 1277
Justice Marshall felt that the rational basis test used in this
case was potentially dangerous for two reasons.278 First, the as-
applied remedy was too narrow because it left the statute in-
tact;2 9 Justice Marshall felt that such an ordinance could only
be based on invidious discrimination against the retarded, and
therefore should be completely stricken.28
Second, invocation of the rational basis standard left the re-
tarded to "run the gauntlet." Since future legislation would ben-
efit from a presumption of constitutionality, the retarded would
still bear the full burden of proving that legislation containing
classifications based on mental retardation is irrational. Mar-
shall would have affirmed the court of appeals' decision in all
respects.2 8'
273. Id. "Jim Crow" refers to the period of history in which "separate but equal"
was the law regarding a Negro's place in society. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896).
274. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3267-68.
275. Id. at 3272-73.
276. Id. at 3275.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. See supra note 236.
280. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3275.
281. Id.
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V. Analysis
A. Principles of Evaluation
The analysis of any Supreme Court case is essentially a
search for the principles and values expressed by the Court
which should transcend the immediate result. The crucial in-
quiry is not so much the nature of the question, but rather, the
nature of the answer.2 2
An examination of the reasoning in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center reveals an inherent ambivalence. While
the Court stated that it will presume the constitutionality of any
given legislative action which draws a distinction for retarded
individuals,2 83 it concluded that requiring a permit for the
Featherston home was an action which could not be rationally
justified.2 8' Thus, the presumption of constitutionality advo-
cated by the Court was weakened in its first application.
This was the first time an equal protection challenge relat-
ing to the retarded was before the Court. Therefore, it was in-
cumbent upon the Court to provide a careful analysis of the
characteristics of the retarded. The Court found the retarded to
have distinguishing characteristics relevant to legitimate state
interests. 285 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the judiciary should
be very reluctant to scrutinize legislative choices.2 6 The Court
doubted that there was a predicate for judicial oversight where
the classification dealt with mental retardation.287 This conclu-
sion was also an expression of the Court's unwillingness to ex-
pand the group of quasi-suspect classes.288
The Court's preference for judicial restraint is truly an ab-
dication of its proper role in protecting the retarded. An exami-
nation of the characterisitics of the retarded reveals that they
resemble the classes deemed suspect more than those designated
as quasi suspect. Furthermore, virtually all the legislative re-
282. H. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 15 (1959).
283. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3258 (1985).
284. Id. at 3260.
285. Id. at 3255.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 3256.
288. Id. at 3257-58.
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forms benefitting the retarded have been the result of judicial
action.289 Thus, the Court's role has already been defined.
B. The Mentally Retarded as a Class
The seminal description of the conditions under which the
Court will extend strict scrutiny to a group or class of individu-
als is contained in United States v. Carolene Products Co..29
Carolene Products described those groups which would receive
special consideration as "discrete and insular" '291 - because
those two conditions "tend to curtail the operations of the politi-
cal processes ordinarily relied upon to protect minorities." 2"
Such groups are designated as "suspect," and legislation affect-
ing such groups is subjected to the most rigid scrutiny, and
therefore, is upheld only if it is based on a public necessity.29
Over the years other factors have been added by the Court to
indicate "suspectness." The class may be saddled with such dis-
abilities,294 or subjected to such purposeful unequal treatment,2"9
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness that it
will command extraordinary protection from the Court. 96 If the
Court believes that a classification is based on a condition that is
"immutable," determined solely by accident of birth,2 97 it may
invoke strict scrutiny.298 As each of these charateristics is ap-
plied to the retarded, a profile of "suspectness" emerges.
When political processes are at issue, the class of mentally
retarded persons must qualify as politically powerless per se.
The retarded are almost universally disenfranchised; 299 they do
289. S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE 4, 39-40 (1983).
290. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See supra note 48.
291. Carotene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
292. Id. See supra note 50.
293. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
294. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). These
characteristics were deemed the "traditional indicia of suspectness." Id. See supra note
188.
295. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
296. Id.
297. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Justice Brennan added this
in his effort to add women to the group of "suspect" classes. See supra text accompany-
ing note 69.
298. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
299. See supra note 180.
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not and indeed, cannot vote. Therefore, the political processes
can never be expected to provide protection. The fact that it
took until 1970 for Congress to enact the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act,30 0 speaks most eloquently for the
absence of political power of the retarded. As recently as 1974,
the United States Office of Education estimated that 1.75 mil-
lion handicapped children were entirely excluded from school-
ing.30' Any progress made on behalf of retarded individuals is
solely the result of the work or the votes of others; the retarded
are and will be inherently dependent on others to make the po-
litical processes work in their favor.
The class of mentally retarded individuals is also, by defini-
tion, saddled with disabilities.0 2 Because of these disabilities,
the retarded have been subjected to purposeful unequal treat-
ment. The legacy of this treatment has not been simply unequal;
it has been dismal. 03 The Supreme Court dealt indirectly with
this subject when it considered Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman.Y" The Supreme Court quoted the "un-
disputed findings of fact" 30 5 regarding conditions at one state in-
stitution: "[C]onditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous,
with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff
members, but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the re-
tarded.' ' 30 6 The Court also found that the physical, intellectual,
and emotional skills of some residents had deteriorated. 307
This "treatment" then, can be called more than unequal; in-
300. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1461 (1970) (current version at 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1454
(1983 & Supp. 1985)).
301. HERR, supra note 289, at 3.
302. See supra note 226.
303. HERR, supra note 289, at 9-29. Herr chronicled the treatment of the retarded
from the English roots when the King gained custody of the lands of "natural fools."
Colonial laws were shaped by the general patterns set by England; retardates were ex-
cluded whenever possible and regimented whenever necessary. The "Age of Asylums"
followed in the 19th century. The retarded were also the object of a eugenics movement,
which sought to sterilize them and even advocated euthanasia. A case involving a state
law compelling eugenic sterilization was upheld by the Supreme Court. In Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927), Justice Holmes stated that "three generations of imbeciles are
enough." Id. at 207.
304. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). See supra Part III.
305. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 7.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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stitutions such as Pennhurst contribute to the disabilities. The
purpose for the establishment of group homes such as the one at
issue in Cleburne is to remove the retarded from such
institutions.
The condition of retardation is also "immutable" and deter-
mined solely by accident of birth. When this was added to the
indicia of suspectness, the Court applied it to the gender classifi-
cations as it discriminated against women.308 While the gender
charateristic is as immutable as retardation, the experiences of
women and the retarded are too diverse to be compared. Fur-
ther, although alienage has been designated as suspect, this is a
condition that is removed by going through the process of be-
coming a citizen.
Clearly, the retarded possess the characteristics that have
been described as requiring a "more exacting judicial scru-
tiny."30 9 However, the majority in Cleburne relied on what it
termed the "lesson of Murgia"310 which proclaimed that age, like
retardation, is relevant to those interests the state has the au-
thority to implement.31' The analogy to the aged is apt only in-
sofar as it applies to legislative interests. The aged have ex-
traordinary control through their right to vote compared to the
retarded who possess none. The disabilities of the aged are also
predictable and universal in contrast to the permanent disad-
vantages of the retarded.
The two categories which the majority cited for heightened
review312 - classifications based on gender or illegitimacy - are
less similar to the retarded than those designated as suspect.
The two groups protected by the heightened scrutiny - women
and illegitimate children - do not suffer from political
powerlessness in the sense of the retarded. Women also have the
important advantage of comprising more than half of the popu-
lation - the converse of a "discrete and insular minority."3 '3
Neither women nor illegitimates have been confined to institu-
tions or deprived of public education as a result of their
308. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
309. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
310. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255. See text accompanying note 210.
311. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
312. Id.
313. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 144 n.4.
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characteristics.
Nevertheless, if the retarded cannot command the most
rigid scrutiny despite their similarity to the suspect classes, it
must be concluded that they deserve a heightened, more search-
ing scrutiny. The interest in a home in the community was
termed "a fundamental liberty"314 by Justice Marshall. Such an
important interest, along with characteristics which bear enough
resemblance to minorities to warrant more than a casual judicial
response are two touchstones of the so-called intermediate re-
view.3 1 5 The fact that some of the distinctions involving illegiti-
mates were relevant to legislative purposes316 did not deprive
them of this enhanced scrutiny.317 A "legitimate" state interest
cannot be used as an excuse for the Court to exercise restraint
when the retarded are before the Court as a last resort - the
legislative process has already failed them.
C. The Judicial Role
The Court stated that the "large and diversified group" of
retarded individuals should be guided by legislators and quali-
fied professionals rather than "the ill-informed opinions of the
judiciary."31'8 One does not have to be "informed," however, to
make a judgment on the conditions described at Pennhurst
School.319 The terms, "dangerous," "physically abused," and "in-
adequate for the retarded" do not require professional interpre-
tation for clear understanding.
Two important cases illustrate that the judiciary has a vital
role to play on behalf of the retarded despite the fact that the
legislature may be the preferred forum for implementing policy
on the retarded. Wyatt v. Stickney,32 ° the first class action suit
314. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266.
315. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-30, at 1082.
316. In Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), the purpose of orderly disposition of prop-
erty at death was sufficient to uphold a restriction; in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976), a requirement that an illegitimate child prove dependency in contrast to the le-
gitimate child whose dependency, for benefits under the Social Security Act was pre-
sumed, was also upheld.
317. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977).
318. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3256.
319. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 7.
320. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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on the right to treatment for retarded individuals, questioned
the very legitimacy of state institutions in future programming
for the retarded.32  The suit in Wyatt was brought on behalf of
residents of three Alabama institutions for the mentally dis-
abled. The Wyatt court held that mentally retarded persons
possess "an inviolable constitutional right to habilitation. '3 1s
Furthermore, the court found that applicable legal principles
"[c]lear beyond cavil" require that people involuntarily commit-
ted through non-criminal procedures to institutions for the men-
tally retarded have a constitutional right to receive such individ-
ual habilitation as will give each of them a realistic opportunity
to lead a more useful and meaningful life and to return to soci-
ety.8 13 Even more importantly, the facts unearthed in Wyatt
provoked a national examination of the role of institutions and
the services -required to free retarded people for community
living.32 4
The real breakthrough in Wyatt was that it demonstrated
that the right to habilitation posed a judicially manageable dis-
pute. The Wyatt court had framed minimum standards, and
thus avoided the pitfalls of case by case adjudication - an im-
practical task for a plaintiff class with over 8000 members.2
The second case, New York State Association for Retarded
Children v. Rockefeller,3 26 (the "Willowbrook" case), produced
plans to dismantle the Willowbrook Developmental Center.32 7
The judgment in the case produced relief in two stages. First,
the court ordered certain steps to prevent further deterioration
and harm to residents: a total prohibition on seclusion, sharp
increases in ward attendants, recreation therapists, nurses, phy-
sicians and physical therapists; second, the court required peri-
odic reports on implementing health, safety, and care mea-
321. HERR, supra note 289, at 124.
322. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 390.
323. Id.
324. HERR, supra note 289, at 124.
325. Id. at 125.
326. 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), judgment approved sub nom. New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
327. At the time this suit was filed, Willowbrook State School was the world's larg-
est retardation institution, housing 5209 residents - "a desperately overcrowded, an-
titherapeutic environment." HERR, supra note 289, at 132.
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sures 3 28 Ultimately, the case produced a consent order 29 by
which the state of New York agreed to reduce, in phases, the
institutionalized population at Willowbrook and to furnish resi-
dents with habilitation services to prepare them for living in new
homes outside the institutions.3 30 In an opinion approving the
consent decree the court explained that protection from harm
necessitates extensive relief because such harm results "not only
from neglect but from conditions which cause regression or
which prevent development of an individual's capabilities. '"33
These two cases clearly show an appropiate judicial role.
There is no virtue in judicial self-restraint when legislatures
have failed to assume responsibility for the retarded.3 2 Reform
followed judicial action when the judiciary in these two cases
recognized that the processes ordinarily relied upon had not
worked. This is precisely the role the Court should assume to
protect those outside the political processes, as the retarded are.
The Court's failure here to treat the retarded as suspect, or at
least quasi suspect, is a failure of judicial confidence in its
unique role within our three-branch system of government.
The Court's statement that the "relevant inquiry . . . is
whether heightened scrutiny is constitutionally mandated in the
first instance ' ' 33 is followed by a caution that requiring a sub-
stantial relationship, or merely requiring the legislature to jus-
tify its efforts "may lead it to refrain from acting at all." 334 This
posture toward the legislature was strengthened by the Court's
pronouncement that it doubted that "the predicate for such ju-
dicial oversight is present where the classification deals with
mental retardation. 3 3 5 By this statement, the Court seemed to
proscribe any role for itself. Its deference to legislative and pro-
328. Rockfeller, 357 F. Supp. at 768-69.
329. See supra note 326.
330. HERR, supra note 289, at 132.
331. New York State Ass'n For Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715,
718 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). Spurred by the Willowbrook decree and subsequent advocacy pres-
sure, New York has placed approximately 3000 persons with profound and severe devel-
opmental disabilities in community residential settings. HERR, supra note 289, at 41.
332. See generally HERR, supra note 289, at 107-59 for an extensive review of pro-
gress from litigation.
333. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 3256.
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fessional judgments, rather than the "ill-informed opinions of
the judiciary, ' '336 echoes the attitude toward the retarded ex-
pressed in Youngberg v. Romeo.337 Professional judgment there
produced conditions which were undisputedly found to be "dan-
gerous," "inadequate," and rife with physical abuse.3 38
As neither professional judgment nor legislative interest
modified these conditions, judicial oversight must. Intervention
in these situations is the proper role for the Court. It must act
when the ordinary processes relied upon have failed. The legacy
of the retarded and the persistence of dangerous, physically abu-
sive conditions such as those identified in Pennhurst demand
more from the Court. The Cleburne decision offers the retarded
only a momentary victory. Local governments remain free from
judicial intervention but legislation runs the risk of invalidation
under an unpredictable invocation of a rational basis test.
VI. Conclusion
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,339 the Su-
preme Court, for the first time, considered the status of mentally
retarded individuals under the equal protection clause. Cleburne
emphasized what the Court thought the judicial role should be
in any equal protection question, rather than dealing with the
characteristics of the retarded or the importance of the issue
presented. Under the banner of judicial restraint, the Court sur-
rendered its responsibility to legislators and professionals. De-
spite this, the Court struck down the ordinance as it applied to
the facts of this case. The Court's failure to adopt even a height-
ened level of scrutiny leaves the retarded without protection ex-
cept from irrational prejudice; and it allows legislatures to pro-
mulgate laws without concern for substantially relating them to
legitimate interests. The paradoxical character of the decision
lies in the assurance of restraint toward legislatures, coupled
with the intervention of the Court. Such a process of decision-
making gives no protection to the retarded and no guidance to
336. Id.
337. 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982).
338. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 7. The institution involved in Romeo was the same one
involved in Pennhurst.
339. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
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law-making bodies. The Court has belittled its own role and,
consequently, the value of this decision.
Elizabeth T. Sharpe
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